Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid in Russia? Estimating the Public-Private Wage Gap by Gimpelson, Vladimir & Lukiyanova, Anna
IZA DP No. 3941
Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid in Russia?



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
January 2009 
Are Public Sector Workers 
Underpaid in Russia? 




CLMS, Higher School of Economics 
and IZA  
 
Anna Lukiyanova 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid in Russia? 
Estimating the Public-Private Wage Gap
*
 
The paper starts with discussing institutional framework for public sector wage setting in 
Russia. Given that individual choice of the sector is endogenous to wages, the authors 
recommend alternative econometric techniques for the public-private wage gap estimation. 
Applying switching regression that allows correcting for non-random sector selection, the 
paper provides wage gap estimates for various demographic, occupational, and territorial 
population subgroups. As it is shown, there is significant cross-group variation in the wage 
gap. The paper concludes that to eliminate the negative gap wages in the public sector 
should be linked to the private sector wages at the regional level. 
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1. Introduction 
The topic of underpaid public sector employees has recently loomed large in discussions 
on economic and social policy in Russia. Over the past 15 years, average wages in education and 
public health, which form the bulk of the public sector, varied between 40% and 60% of the 
average wage in industry. Even by the end of 2007, after repeated revisions of the mandatory 
minimum wage, it did not exceed the upper limit of this band.  
A simple comparison of average wages across sectors and industries does not provide 
sufficient grounds for deriving a conclusion that there are wage gaps between the sectors. Nor 
does it indicate the size of the gap because workers in different sectors have different levels of 
education, skills and experience. Besides, high wages may compensate for hazardous labor 
conditions, climate disamenities and other negative aspects of work. Finally, in choosing their 
occupations people are guided not only by earnings perspectives but also by personal 
predispositions and preferences. All this implies that dealing only with average wages 
aggregated for all the surveyed workers across several sectors one ends up with comparing 
incomparable entities. Such assessments should be treated as approximations at best. However, if 
one tries to take into account all the above differences what would then be the wage differential 
between the public and private sectors? Is it the same for all groups of workers? How different is 
the gap in regions with different levels of economic development? Finally, if the gap between 
average wages is so large, what is the reason?  
Note that problems at the labor market may arise both if public sector employees are 
underpaid and if they are overpaid. Negative wage differentials give rise to adverse selection and 
drag down wages in entire economy thereby inflating ineffective employment and encouraging 
corruption. Conversely, wage advantages of the public sector relative to the private sector tend to 
crowd out private employment and reduce overall employment, as shown by the evidence from 
Western Europe.
3  
There is ample economic literature discussing public-private wage gaps in many 
developed and developing countries. Most of the studies reveal that public sector workers are 
likely to get a positive wage premium relative to private sector workers if major individual and 
job related characteristics are controlled for. This empirical conclusion corresponds well with the 
institutional framework within which the public sector pays wage rates prevailing in the private 
sector. Higher job security and unionization of public sector workers (teachers, doctors, 
municipal and postal workers, etc) as well as a political clout around many public sector 
activities strengthen their bargaining power easing access to rent (wage premia).  
 
3 Algann Y., P.Cahuc, and A.Zylberberg (2002) Public Employment and Labour Market 
Performance, Economic Policy, Vol.17, 34, 7-66.   4
                                                
 Russia, so far, has been exempt from the list of countries where the public-private wage 
gap is exposed to scrutiny. Two particular reasons make the Russian case quite interesting. First, 
the wage setting framework here seems to be rather different and its wage outcome can be less 
obvious. Second, the large public sector in Russia can put strong pressure on private sector 
wages.  
As a point of departure, we consider the public sector as consisting of organizations in 
public health, education, culture and public administration, which are mostly state owned and 
produce public goods being funded from the federal and regional (local) budgets.
4 According to 
official quotes, 14.4 millions employees, or about 22% of total employment, receive their wages 
from the budgets of various levels. In 2003, 88.8% of all employed in public health worked in 
state-owned establishments; in education and culture this proportion was 96.0% and 84.3%, 
correspondingly.  
In the beginning of economic transition in 1992, real wages in the public sector dropped 
more dramatically than in the rest of economy (Figure 1). The same pattern of drastic fall was 
repeatedly observed after the 1994 and 1998 macro-shocks. Only public administration made an 
exception with a relatively small shock-induced drop in wages followed by rapid after-shock 
wage recovery. By 1999, the real wage in the three major sub-sectors of the public sector made 
just one third of the 1991 level. However, the wage growth in the public sector has accelerated 
since that and by 2004 it has increased threefold compared to the 1999 level. Nevertheless, the 
inter-sectoral difference in the wage growth rates was not sufficient to compensate for the wage 
gaps that emerged earlier.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the mean wage in the public sector relative to the mean 
wage in industry. The gap between them has been large and robust over the whole period starting 
from 1992. The wage of an average public sector worker has fluctuated at the level of around 50-
65% of the wage of an average industrial worker, though the former is much better educated than 
the latter. Therefore, the presence of significant public-private wage gap appears to be 
undisputable fact even from the raw data, i.e. when important skill differences between the 
sectors are ignored. Accounting for these structural differences and thus measuring gaps for 
comparable workers is likely to widen the gaps.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we outline the 
institutional framework for the public sector wage setting. The data description and main 
definitions are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the descriptive picture for public-
private wage gaps using unadjusted wage estimates. Then we move to the regression analysis, 
which is discussed in Section 5. Here, we present econometric methodology and estimates from 
 
4 This definition is not used throughout the paper. We slightly modify it in subsequent sections to 
fit our microdata.    5
                                                
OLS and switching regressions. Section 6 deals with intersectional transitions and uses fixed-
effect model. Public-private gaps in cross-regional perspective are investigated in Section 7 and  
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Wage-Setting in Russian Public Sector: Institutional Framework 
 
Organizations in the public sector are not profit maximizers and are directly administered 
by the government that may strongly politicize decisions in relation to this sector.
5 On the 
contrary, private sector wages are supposed to be set by the competitive market. Therefore, 
wage-related market signals have to be translated from the private sector labor market into the 
public sector. The capabilities of the government to receive these signals and transform them into 
public sector wages (without bending to political interests) affect the very existence and 
magnitude of the public-private wage gap.  
The market-driven wage setting leaves little room for bureaucrats to manipulate wages. In 
this sense, public sector wages have become exogenous for the state as an employer and are 
fixed by the private sector directly or through negotiations with the unions. What is left here for 
bureaucrats is to regulate the quantity of employment within given budget constraints.   
In Russia (as well as in other CIS countries), wage-setting framework in the public sector 
is completely different from that in the OECD countries. It does not account ex ante for relative 
wages as they emerge at the competitive labor market. Wages usually consist of two parts – 
guaranteed or basic and variable. Basic (i.e. tariff-based) component of the budgetary sector 
wage is defined by the federal authorities through politico-bureaucratic bargaining over the 
statutory minimum wage (MW) and the Unified Tariff Scale (UTS)
6, while the further 
adjustment emerges spontaneously through the variable part as a response to market forces.  
The basic (tariff) wage in the budgetary sector is the UTS-based. The minimum UTS 
grade is linked to the MW, level of which is fixed uniformly by the federal legislation and does 
not vary across the regions. The UTS and MW upward adjustments emerge irregularly as a by-
product of politico-economic bargaining and expected budget revenues. Therefore, they are 
linked to world commodity (that make up the major share of Russian exports and thus are 
 
5 For international surveys and theory see: R.Ehrenberg and J.Schwarz. Public Sector Labor 
Markets. Handbook of Labor Economics, Chapter 22, Vol.II, Ed.by O.Ashenfelter and R.Layard, 
Elsevier, 1986; R.Gregory and J.Borland, Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets. 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Chapter 53, Vol.III, Elsevier, 1999. 
6 The Federal Law No.122 (2004) allows regional governments not to stick to the UTS grades in 
wage determination in the budgetary organizations which are in regional/municipal jurisdiction. 
However, we have no evidence that this legislative amendment is actively used.    6
                                                
responsible for budgetary revenues) prices and domestic politics but completely disregard 
regional labor markets equilibria. Meanwhile, the UTS determines not the actual consumer wage 
level itself but its lower bound guaranteed by the state. How far upwards the wage can actually 
move depends upon other factors.
7  
Since the UTS and MW levels are not regionally sensitive, fixing their levels the central 
government has to account somehow for regional heterogeneity and is therefore constrained by 
fiscal position of the weakest region. This makes basic wage for public sector workers in all 
other (better-off) regions understated comparing to competitive wages at the relevant regional 
labor markets. The more developed a region is, the better its fiscal position and the higher 
current private sector wage is, the stronger its upward pressure on budgetary sector wages can 
be. All this generates pressure on the public sector and drives its wages up with using additional 
over-tariff bonuses or premium. The premium size reflects not only regional/local fiscal 
resources, but the bargaining power of education/health care administrators and trade unions as 
well. This logic predicts that public sector workers in economically advanced regions are likely 
to have higher actual nominal wages than in depressed regions. However, at the same time the 
public-private wage gap will be larger in advanced regions since the gap between the UTS-based 
pay and the private sector wage widens and accommodating for it becomes more difficult. Fig. 3 
illustrates the wage setting mechanism described above.  
In fact, regional bureaucrats “share” budgetary revenues with teachers or doctors when 
regional fiscal position is good and workers’ voice is loud enough. On the contrary, they keep 
wages close to the UTS-based lower bound when revenues are scarce and the voice is weak. 
Procyclical regional fiscal policies contribute to inter-regional differentiation and impose 
additional risks on regional budgets.
8   
The mechanism of wage setting based on the revenue sharing appears to be a systemic 
feature of the Russian economy. In Russian corporations, managers who enjoy significant power 
over workers (like bureaucrats in the public sector) also tend to tie workers’ wage to firm 
economic/financial performance instead of relating it to individual productivity. In fact, they 
share revenues with workers in “good times” and losses in “bad times”.
9 This makes the wage 
setting machineries in the public sector and in the old industrial sector quite similar, and both fit 
 
7 Tariff-based pay makes less than 50% of the total wage bill in education and 34-38% in public 
health organizations, which are under regional or municipal jurisdiction. 
8 Kwon G. and A.Spilembergo (2004) “Russia’s Regions: Income Volatility, Labor Mobility and 
Fiscal Policy”. In: Russian Federation: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report 04/316, IMF, 
Washington, September 2004.  
9 Kapelyushnikov R. (2003) “Wage-Setting Mechanisms in the Russian Industry”, HSE Working 
Paper No.WP3/2003/07.    7
                                                
well the model which we call (after Richard Layard) “the Russian model in labour market 
adjustment”.
10  
Therefore, the centralized approach toward wage setting of public sector workers based 
upon minimum wage standard that is uniform for the whole country is likely to drive down 
wages in the sector. This turns potential public sector premium into actual penalty.  
Underpayment of public sector workers relative to private sector workers with 
comparable characteristics may is likely to induce negative selection into the public sector. Then, 
the public sector being a large employer sends feedback signals to the commercial sector 
stimulating wage containment. This drives all wages down in exchange for excessive 
employment. This effect is especially visible in depressed regions where bloated public 
employment is combined with underdeveloped private sector. 
This short institutional overview brings us to formulating a few hypotheses related to the 
public-private wage gap. First of all, we expect that for most of public sector workers this gap 
(adjusted for personal characteristics) to be associated with a penalty not a premium. Secondly, 
the gap is likely to vary across social and demographic groups depending on the bargaining 
power of a particular group. Thirdly, the gap is expected to be smaller in more depressed regions. 
In the next sections, we are dealing with testing these hypotheses.   
 
3. Data and Definitions 
In estimating wage gaps we rely on two sets of microdata. First of all, we use the RLMS 
data set for 2000-2004. The RLMS is a representative household panel study that allows 
capturing cross-sectional as well as temporal variation. We limit our study to this time period 
due to three main reasons. First, this was a period of stable economic growth with no negative 
shocks for the labor market. Such macroshocks could bring short-term but significant deviations 
of the relative wage from its long-run equilibrium level. Second, during this period the MW was 
raised several times shifting up the whole UTS. The third reason was that the surveys were 
conducted annually during this period (not bi-annually as in the earlier period).  
As an additional source for estimating the wage gap and its geography we use the 
NOBUS data.
11 The NOBUS was conducted by the Russian Statistical Agency (ROSSTAT) and 
the World Bank in Q2 2003. It is a cross-sectional survey but has a large sample of around 45000 
households covering all Russian regions and is representative for 46 of them. 
 
10 The main property of this model is in an extraordinary wage flexibility paired with stability of 
employment.  
11 NOBUS is the transliterated Russian abbreviation for the National Survey of Household Well-
being and Participation in Social Programs.    8
                                                
Our sample is restricted to individuals aged 15-72 and excludes self-employed. We 
identify our respondent as a “public sector worker” if he/she is employed in education, health 
care, or public administration and marks the government ownership for his employer. Public 
sector workers made 25.3% of total employment in the RLMS sample for 2000-2003. In 
NOBUS, the relevant proportion is slightly higher and equal to 27%. All other employees are 
considered as being employed in the private sector.
12  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly wage. To compare wages over time 
and account for region-specific inflation rates we deflate the nominal wage by monthly regional 
CPIs.  In our regressions, in order to account for all job-related income we control for major non-
pecuniary benefits linked to jobs, and for earnings from secondary employment. We also control 
all major individual characteristics (gender, age, tenure, education, family status, occupation) 
and job-related characteristics (town/city size, firm size, working hours and employment 
conditions). The RLMS offers also subjective measures such as life and job satisfaction, fear of 
job loss, willingness to change job, and self-estimate of difficulties associated with job mobility.  
 
4. Descriptive Analysis of the Public-Private Wage Gap 
Employment composition  
According to Table 1 the employment composition differs in the both sectors. First, in the 
public sector, women are more likely to have tertiary education and to belong to the group of 
professionals. Workers occupations, on the contrary, concentrate outside the public sector. 
Second, relatively more public sector workers reside in small towns and rural area. Third, public 
sector workers have on average 8.5 years of tenure compared to 7.4 years for private sector 
workers. Longer tenure suggests lower inter- and intra-sectoral mobility. Fourth, workers in the 
both sectors differ only slightly in terms of age but the proportion of pensioners is significantly 
higher among public sector workers (17% vs 10-11%). This can be explained by the fact that 
women in Russia retire at 55, 5 years earlier than men, and the public sector is women-
dominated. Fifth, the duration of working week in the public sector is shorter by 5 hours. 
The above-mentioned compositional differences are likely to have different impact on the 
wage gap. Higher education and longer tenure, other things being equal, tend to increase relative 
wage. Meanwhile, shorter working hours and disproportionately large shares of women and rural 
residents may have the opposite effect.  
 
12 These estimates are close to official estimates from the Russian Labour Force Survey 
measuring employment in education, public health and public administration as 25% of the total.    9
                                                
 
What is the Wage Gap: Preliminary Estimates 
Tables 2a and 2b summarize the estimates for the public-private sector wage gap from 
the RLMS and NOBUS data, respectively. Column 2 in the both tables presents unadjusted 
sectoral wage differentials measured in percent of the relevant private sector wage
13. In all 
population sub-groups public sector workers receive less than the opportunity wage. Though the 
RLMS-based estimates are two times higher than the NOBUS-based estimates the signs and the 
structure of the wage gap are similar in the both data sets. In the further discussion, we mostly 
rely on the estimates from the RLMS, while NOBUS-based estimates are used for cross-regional 
comparisons only.  
The RLMS data suggests that wages in the public sector are on average 40% lower than 
in the private sector. In 2002, the wage gap contracted to -34% but later on it returned to the 
initial level. For the whole period under consideration, the magnitude of the sectoral wage 
differential hardly changed in spite regular increases in the minimum wage, which is the nominal 
anchor for public sector wages. Gender-specific wage gaps are significantly smaller than the gap 
for the whole sample. This difference can be explained by gender asymmetry in the occupational 
structure. Since women are disproportionally concentrated in the public sector, the gender wage 
gap reinforces the sectoral wage gap.  
 Differences in earnings can vary depending on the level of experience, education and 
skill of a worker, and on the demand and supply conditions for various types of labor. The 
sectoral gap tends to diminish with workers’ age reflecting the fact that wage ladders in the 
public sector are to a greater extent dependent on seniority and tenure. Larger negative 
differential is observed among the workers with lower education and skills as compared to high-
skilled workers. The public-private wage differentials are higher in urban as compared to rural 
areas. Premiums for employment in the private sector increase with the size of the settlement. 
More competitive environment in larger cities raises wages outside the public sector.  
 
Fringe benefits and working conditions 
Comparison of non-wage aspects of total compensation reveals substantial advantages to 
public sector employees.  
First, jobs in the private sector are more often associated with intensive manual work. 
Only 11-13% of public sector workers are involved in this type of work compared to 33-34% of 
 
13 In order to eliminate time effects in the RLMS data we employed the following procedure. 
First, we estimated separate wage equations for each sector with year dummies as control 
variables and then calculated the wages net of year effects. The calculation of unadjusted wage 
differentials is based on these wages corrected for year effects.   10
                                                
private sector workers (Table 1). For those working manually, its intensity is also much higher in 
the private sector.  
Second, though the Labor Code provisions concerning social guarantees are not 
differentiated across sectors, their enforcement in the public sector is much more complete. 
Nearly all public sector workers report getting vacation payments, sickness payments and 
maternity leave allowances, while in the private sector these provisions are far from being 
universal. Higher fraction of public sector workers has access to free or subsidized health care, 
training and vouchers for vacation trips. In some cases private sector workers find themselves in 
more favorable conditions. First of all, this applies to loan access. Private sector workers are also 




Overall comparative advantage of the public sector can find a reflection in subjective 
measures of life and job satisfaction, and of the willingness to change current job (Table 4). It is 
commonly accepted that preferences towards the public sector are often motivated by risk 
aversion behaviour at the labour market. Therefore, occupational choice is likely to be correlated 
with unemployment fears and uncertainty about one’s chances to find a new job
14. In fact, the 
distribution of answers to the RLMS question: “How much do you worry about possible job 
loss?” is skewed towards high levels of anxiety in the public sector. However, the sectoral 
differences are not dramatic. For instance, the risk of losing the job is perceived as high by 49% 
of public sector workers compared to 55% of private sector workers. At the same time, 40% of 
public sector workers and 34% of private sector workers do not worry about possible job loss. 
Public sector workers are also more confident in their chances to find a new job at comparable 
contract terms. May be the true reason for that is that their reservation wage is low and low paid 
jobs are easily available.  
Willingness to change a job is an indirect measure of satisfaction with current job. The 
fraction of those who want to change job is as high as two third in both sectors and differences 
between the two sectors are negligible.  
In 2002 and 2003, RLMS respondents were asked to answer direct questions about job 
satisfaction. As shown in Table 4, greater fraction of public sector workers is satisfied with job 
 
14 The unemployment fears themselves may be a significant factor of wage growth moderation. 
For details see: Gimpelson V.,  Kapelyushnikov R. and T.Ratnikova (2003) “Has Fear Big Eyes? 
Fear of Unemployment and Wage Flexibility”, HSE Economic Journal, 2003, Vol.7, No.3 (in 
Russian). in general, with working conditions and career prospects while private sector workers are more 
often happy with their wages.  
Summing up cross-sectoral comparison of non-wage aspects of work and subjective 
assessments, we may conclude that most but not all of non-wage and subjective features point at 
the clear advantages of the public sector. This proves intuitive conclusion that each sector has its 
own comparative advantages in terms of compensation, which cannot be reduced to wage 
averages. Comparing wages we should account for all possible dimensions of working 
conditions and work compensation.  
In the next section we turn to multivariable analysis of the public-private wage gap. 
 
5. Regression Analysis of the Public-Private Wage Gap (Pooled OLS) 
We start with estimation of the standard Mincerian earnings equation using OLS 
techniques: 
, ) ( 0 i i
j
ji j i u sD x Wage Ln + + + = ∑β β        (1) 
where X’s are individual characteristics, u is the error term (ui ~ NID (0, σ
2)), Di is equal 1 for the 
budget sector workers and 0 otherwise. Pooled OLS regressions implicitly impose the restriction 
that the returns to observed characteristics are the same for the two sectors and that public-
private differences depend on a shift factor (dummy variable) only. Coefficient s shows the 
magnitude of the public-private wage gap
15. Equation (1) was estimated separately for each 
population sub-group. 
We estimate the basic and an augmented specification of equation (1). Our basic 
specification controls only for major individual characteristics (gender, age, age squared, tenure, 
tenure squared, education, occupation, marital status, duration of working week, region, type of 
settlement) and year effects. It does not account for other aspects of employment that may have 
compensatory impact. In fact, such job and personal characteristics as provision of fringe 
benefits, opportunities for moonlighting and risk aversion may affect the selection of the sector 
of employment. That is why we add additional variables to equation (1) and estimate augmented 
specifications. 
The estimation results for the RLMS and the NOBUS data are presented in Tables 2а and 
2b, respectively. R
2 for all equations are between 0.36 and 0.60. We find negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for the whole sample and for most population subgroups. 
                                                 
15 Since wages enter the left-hand side of equation (1) in logs, the effect of having a job in the 
public sector is measured as  . For details see: Halvorsen, R., and R.Palmquist 
(1980) “The Interpretation of Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 70 (3), pp.474-475. 
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Compared to raw wage differentials, adjusting for the difference in human capital characteristics 
between the sectors results in narrowing the gap. In general, conditioning on a larger set of 
variables further reduces the estimated differential.  
Since the OLS regression ignores the endogeneity of sectoral choice, all the estimated 
returns are risk to be seriously biased. To address the endogeneity problem we use two 
alternative approaches and they are switching regression and fixed effects model. 
 
Switching Regression 
The use of switching regression is motivated by the fact that wage-setting mechanisms 
may differ between sectors and the choice of sector is a result of non-random selection process. 
To choose between the sectors, an individual compares expected net benefits in each sector and 
selects the job that best rewards her/his individual set of characteristics. Once an individual 
decides on the preferred sector, she/he enters the pool of applicants from which employers select. 
The probability of being selected within a particular sector depends on the individual’s 
characteristics (observed and unobserved) as well as on characteristics of the employer. The 
observed individual outcome is a combination of preferences and job rationing.  
The SR model contains two wage equations (one for each sector) and selection 
equation
16. Additionally, it assumes joint dependence of the error terms in wage and selection 
equations. In terms of empirical strategy, this leads to a two-stage Heckman-type estimation. On 
the first stage, we estimate the sector choice model and generate the selection term (similar to 
inverse Mill’s ratio) for every alternative. On the second stage, we estimate wage equations with 
relevant selection terms and other explanatory variables. To solve the identification problem we 
include into selection equation variables that influence the choice of the sector but not the 
individual wage. We use a single variable (the presence of children under 7 in a household) for 
the RLMS data and three variables (the presence of children under 7 in a household, the presence 
of children aged 8-15 in a household and the dummy for part-time employment) for the NOBUS 
data. Having small children can motivate preferences for secure job, flexibility of working time 
and non-pecuniary benefits. 
Having obtained unbiased estimates of returns to human capital characteristics, we can 
predict expected wages for each sector and derive corresponding wage differentials. We 
calculate the conditional wage differentials based on conditional wages in each sector. The 
 
16 For technical details see Maddala, G.S., 1984, “Disequilibrium, Self-Selection and Switching 
Models”, in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol.3, eds. Z. Griliches and M.D. Intrilligator, North 
Holland, Amsterdam. conditional wage is what the wage of public sector workers would be if they faced the wage 
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where λ is the selection term, σp is the variance of the error term in the wage equation for the 
private sector, subscript g denotes the public sector, subscript p denotes the private sector. The 
magnitude of the overall gap was computed as the difference between actual and conditional 
average wage of public sector workers measured in percent of the conditional average. To obtain 
group-specific gaps the averages are taken within the relevant group. 
Table 5 presents estimation results for the basic specification using the RLMS data. The 
Wald test confirms the hypothesis of non-random selection into the public sector. Differences in 
returns between the sectors show that the public sector gives higher value to education and 
qualifications. Public sector workers also get advantage from employment at large-size 
establishments. On the contrary, wages in the private sector are more sensitive to local labour 
market conditions as it is shown by the coefficients for the settlement type dummies.  
Compared to the OLS estimates, the correction for sectoral choice narrows the overall 
gap from -26-28% to -16-18% in the RLMS data and has no effect in the NOBUS data (Tables 
2a and 2b). The gap is approximately the same for both men and women.  
The public-private sector gap varies significantly across population sub-groups. It is 
significantly higher for younger workers and tends to narrow with age reflecting growing returns 
to tenure in the public sector. Workers with completed secondary education are most severely 
underpaid (-26%). Workers with tertiary education experience quite moderate though still 
significantly negative gaps. Among occupational groups, potential wages are the highest for 
skilled and unskilled blue-collar occupations (-29-33%). Workers in other occupations could get 
about 20% premium if they change the sector.    
Conditioning for selection into the public sector strongly affects the wage differential in 
economically backward regions – South, Far East, and Siberia. For these regions, the size of the 
gap contracts by 11-18 percentage points. For Central, North-Western and Volga regions the 
reduction is modest and makes about 5 percentage points. Accounting for endogeneity turns the 
penalty into a small but statistically significant premium of 5%.   
Though the RLMS questionnaire is extensive and covers various aspects of economic 
behaviour, we are aware of that that our instruments may not fully capture the effect of 
unobservables. Many other personal characteristics can influence an individual’s choice for the 
                                                 
17 For the estimation, we used movestay and mspredict Stata modules developed by M.Lokshin 
and Z.Sajaia (Lokshin, M. and Z.Sajaia (2004) “Maximum likelihood estimation of endogenous 
switching regression models”, Stata Journal, Vol.4, Number 3, pp. 282–289). 
  13  14
public sector, among which individual tastes, family background, occupational prestige are most 
likely candidates. Moreover, the estimation procedure assumes joint normality of the error terms 
in all equations. If the joint distribution of the error terms is non-normal, the estimated 
coefficients of wage equations could be severely biased and the estimated gaps would be 
incorrect. To overcome this potential problem we apply alternative method – fixed effects 
estimation. 
 
6. Inter-Sectoral Flows and Premium for the Sector Change 
This section investigates labour flows within and between the sectors as well as their  
interaction with the pools of unemployed and those out of labor force. We also estimate 
economic returns to the inter-sectoral transitions. This section relies on the RLMS data. 
 
Transition probabilities 
Smaller fraction of short-tenured workers (Table 1) is itself indicative for  low inflows of 
the workforce into the public sector and low outflows from it. However, this summary measure 
tells us little about the sources of workers coming to the public sector and the destinations of 
those who leave it. In order to answer these questions we divided all the respondents into four 
groups: employed in the public sector; employed in the private sector; unemployed and those out 
of labour force. Mobility diagram in Figure 4 depicts transitions between these four groups as 
well job changes within the two sectors of employment. We look at all consecutive years within 
the period 2000-03  and then pool the estimates. 
Public sector workers leaving their jobs are more likely to find new jobs in the private 
sector (7%) than to land in the public sector once again (4%). For private sector workers, the 
reverse is true: majority of movers find new jobs in the same sector while only a minor fraction 
of leavers moves into to the public sector. The public sector seems to be isolated from the pool of 
unemployment. On the one hand, workers leaving the public sector hardly ever end up in 
unemployment. On the other hand, the public sector rarely recruits the unemployed and interacts 
(through inflows and outflows) mostly with economically inactive population. The estimated 
sectoral wage differentials can explain low attractiveness of jobs in the public sector and, 
consequently, low inflows into this sector. However, low outflows from the public sector are a 
puzzle. One may assume  there exist some additional unobservable advantages for  employment 
in this sector. Alternatively, we may speculate that long work experience in the public sector 
stigmatises workers thus complicating their mobility into the commercial sector. 
 
The magnitude of the sector-change premium During the period under consideration 210 individuals (7.1% of all public sector workers) 
moved from the public to the private sector. Another 226 individuals (2.4% of all private sector 
workers) moved in the opposite direction. The wage change occurring with the sector change 
ceteris paribus can be viewed as an effect of the sector switch.  Thus we can use fixed effects 
model and estimate the following equation: 
it it it i it sD X Wage Ln ε β α + + + = ) (         ( 3 )  
where  αi  is individual fixed effect which reflects the impact of all unobservable personal 
characteristics which do not change over time. X’s are the same as in OLS and SR regressions 
except gender, region and settlement type, which are in our data constant over time (the RLMS 
does not follow respondents who move to another locations). 
Fixed effects model has two important advantages. First, returns to sector mobility are 
estimated only for those who have really switched the sector. Second, it effectively solves the 
endogeneity problem under the assumption that sector choice is correlated with unobservable but 
constant (fixed) personal characteristics.  
Estimates from the fixed effects model are presented in the last column of Table 2a. We 
calculated the wage gaps for the whole sample and separately for men and women. Further 
splitting of the sample critically diminishes number of sector switchers. As shown in the table, 
moving to a job in the private sector might be extremely beneficial for public sector workers. 
Both men and women gain 20% in earnings when moving for the private sector. The gain is 
lower than it is suggested by the OLS estimates but is comparable to the SR estimates.  
As comparison of all the estimates reveals, about a half of the unadjusted wage 
differential can be explained by observed and unobserved worker and job characteristics. 
Introducing additional controls lowers the wage gap. At least part of the wage differential is 
compensatory. However, extensive sets of controls still leave significant unexplained negative 
wage differential for public sector workers suggesting persistent violation of the “equal pay for 
equal work ” principle. 
 
7. Public-Private Wage Gap on the Country “Map” 
The existing framework of wage-setting in the public sector implies the positive 
relationship between the size of the wage gap and the level of regional development. This 
machinery produces a “layered cake”: there are basic or mandatory ingredients and there are 
supplements that can be added if available. In relatively successful regions this ‘cake’ has more 
layers (including supplements – premia and bonuses) and the layers themselves are thicker. In 
less successful, the wage consists from the basic (mandatory) part only. In this section of the 
paper we relate the wage gap to per capita gross regional product (GRP) and regional 
unemployment. 
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One of the key advantages of the NOBUS sample is in its representativeness for 46 
regions spread across the whole Russian territory. This allows us going beyond the national level 
and estimating the wage gap for each of these regions. We employ propensity score matching 
(with kernel matching) and bootstrapping procedure to obtain  estimates and  standard errors of 
the wage gap separately for each region. Non-parametric matching methods propose alternative 
(to the regression framework) solution to the problem of selection into the public sector. Having 
a job in the public sector can be viewed as a specific ‘treatment’ applied to an employee that 
drives actual wages of the ‘treated’ away from the wages they could alternatively have if they 
were in the private sector. The basic idea behind this is to construct  a ‘control’ group of private 
sector workers who are similar to public sector workers in all relevant pre-treatment 
characteristics. Observed wage differences between the control and the treatment groups can be 
attributed to the sector effect. Propensity score matching (PSM) methods are based on the 
calculation of the propensity score which is the conditional probability to participate in treatment 
group given all relevant observable characteristics. As a probability it takes values from 0 to 1. 
Values of the propensity score for each individual are computed using probit or logit models. 
Thus, the propensity score is a compressed one-dimensional measure of individual differences 
that rule the selection into the public sector. The next step is to compare a wage of each public 
sector worker with a wage of a private sector worker with similar value of the propensity score 
and to average such differences across all public sector workers. 
The kernel matching uses all those employed in the private sector of the relevant region 
as a comparison group for each public sector employee. In this case the counterfactual wage is 
constructed as a weighted average where weights depend on the distance in propensity scores. 
The higher weight is attributed to individuals with similar or close propensity scores and those 
with distant propensity scores receive lower weights.  
Our estimates show that in all but one (Dagestan) out of 46 regions, wages are markedly 
higher in the private sector. In nine (of 46 in the sample) regions the gap is not significantly 
different from zero. Three out of these 9 regions are located in the less developed Southern 
Federal District. In the remaining 36 regions the gap is significantly positive. Note that in 21 
regions (slightly more than 50% of all regions in the sample) the gap exceeds 20%.  
Figures 5 and 6 plot the wage gap against the per capita gross regional product (GRP) 
and the regional unemployment rate. Figure 5 excludes two regions (Moscow city and Tyumen’ 
oblast’) in which per capita GRP levels are more than two times higher than the national average. 
Both regions appear as outliers in descriptive statistics and lay far away from the regression line 
drawn for all other regions. Both regions play an exceptional role in the Russian economy due to 
the capital status (Moscow) or due to the concentration of oil extraction (Tyumen’). In the both 
cases, regional and local budgets enjoy extra opportunities to raise compensations for public   17
                                                
sector workers above average nominal levels. However, even here public sector workers are 
significantly underpaid (against the private sector control group) and the magnitude of the wage 
gap is pretty similar to the national average gap.  
Figure 5 clearly shows that in the poorest regions wages of comparable workers in the 
public sector and private sector are almost the same. The sectoral gap increases as per capita 
GRP grows. On average, the 10% increase in per capita GRP leads to 1.1 percentage point 
increase in the private sector premium. These results well illustrate the fact that the existing 
payment system in the public sector is linked to the possibilities of the weakest regions and 
penalizes workers in the richer regions. 
The relationship between wage gaps and regional unemployment rates is even more 
acute. Public sector workers are stronger penalized in the regions with low unemployment. 
Figure 6 shows that 1 percentage point increase in the regional unemployment rate narrows the 
gap by 1.5 percentage points. Higher regional unemployment restrains wage growth in the 
private sector pressing the wages down to the levels set by the government in the public sector. 
Our analysis in this section leads  to important policy implications. First, it suggests that 
rising public sector wages by the same amount in all regions (as it has been the governmental 
policy) is not a reasonable strategy. Such a wage shift may narrow a negative gap in some 
regions while turning the penalty into a premium in other regions. In its turn, large positive gaps 
may increase labour costs in the private sector, suppress local employment and generate extra 
unemployment by pushing up the reservation wages. It will mostly be the case for the poorest 
regions, which are already grappled with low employment levels and high unemployment rates. 
The consequences of a uniform increase in the public sector wages will be even more profound if 
we account for spillover effects in the private sector.  
Italy provides a good example of differences in the public-private wage gaps under 
centralized wage-setting in a country with heterogeneous regional development. The wage-
setting for the public sector in Italy is based on collective bargaining but the agreed wage rates 
do not vary across regions and are not adjusted for situation at the local labour markets. As a 
result, the highest positive public-private pay differential is in the South. In the North, the 
differential is still positive but considerably smaller in magnitude. Therefore, differences in wage 
gaps may be said to act as a redistributive mechanism from  wealthier North to the economically 
more backward South. Negative consequence of huge wage differential in the South is that it 
suppresses the private sector in southern provinces by discouraging job creation and crowding 
out jobs into the informal sector.
18 Analyzing the case of Italy, Dell’Aringa et al (2005) 
 
18 Alesina A., Danninger S. and Rostagno M. “Redistribution Through Public Employment: The 
Case of Italy”, NBER Working Paper No.7387, Oct 1999;  Dell’Aringa C., C.Lucifora and conclude: «This system (of pay determination in the public sector – Authors) would benefit from 
more decentralization, if local labor market conditions have to play a role. National agreements 
do not need to be discarded, but they should (at least) be less important in determining pay 
increases: ideally they could be a point of reference with some further (flexible) negotiations at 
the local level».
19 This conclusion seems to apply to Russia as well. 
 
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
The main conclusion from our study is that wages for the majority of public sector 
employees should be decentralized and should be tied to the functioning of regional labor 
markets. The negotiations of the education and public health workers trade unions with regional 
administrations may be one such mechanism of tying wages to the labor market situation. Yet, so 
far few regions have chosen not to base the wages of public sector employees on the unified 
wage scale, although they are allowed to do so according to the federal law.  
Besides, labor compensation is closely linked to employment. A more rigid and 
decentralized pegging of the public sector wages to those in the private sector (that is, creation of 
institutional conditions for eliminating the gap) would require more flexibility in employment. 
The public sector should shed part of its labor force by getting rid of redundant people and 
abandoning the functions of social protection that are not inherent in it. In other words the wage 
reform must become an element in a systemic reform of Russian public sector. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.Origo. Public Sector Pay and Regional Competitiveness: A First Look at Regional Public-
Private Wage Differentials in Italy. IZA DP No.1828, October 2005.  
19 Dell’Aringa C., C.Lucifora and F.Origo. Op.cit. p.38.  
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Figure 4. Labor Mobility 
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Figure 6. The Public-Private Wage Gaps and Regional Unemployment 
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Figure 5. The Public-Private Wage Gaps and Regional Development Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  All  Public sector  Private sector 
  2000    2001 2002 2003          2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003      2004 2000 2001    2002 2003 2003    2004
  RLMS RLMS RLMS NOBUS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS  RLMS NOBUS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS NOBUS RLMS  RLMS 
Employment by sector, % of total 
employment  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.4      25.1 25.1 26.9            25.8 25.8 74.6 75.0 74.9 73.1      74.2 74.3
Female , %  52.9  53.6  53.7  53.1            54.4 54.2 74.7 76.9 74.6 75.1            76.4 77.6 45.2 45.8 46.8 45.0      46.8 46.0
Education, %                              
No education. primary education 0.8      0.6 0.4 0.9            0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8            0.3 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.4 1.0      0.4 0.4
Incomplete secondary + vocational 4.0      3.9 3.5 3.9            4.3 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.2            2.5 1.9 4.7 4.5 3.9 4.5      5.0 4.3
Incomplete secondary 8.2      7.5 7.7 7.0            7.4 7.3 3.5 4.7 5.0 4.3            4.9 4.2 9.8 8.5 8.5 8.0      8.3 8.3
Complete secondary + vocational 16.6      17.3 17.2 8.4            17.0 17.9 8.9 7.9 8.7 4.7            9.4 10.8 19.2 20.4 20.0 9.8      19.6 20.4
Complete secondary 22.0      22.1 22.0 20.3            21.4 21.2 12.6 14.1 13.0 12.9            12.4 12.5 25.2 24.7 25.0 23.1      24.5 24.2
College 26.0      24.6 25.5 34.2            25.0 25.2 33.1 29.7 31.5 35.0            31.1 29.9 23.5 22.9 23.5 34.0      22.9 23.5
Some university     3.6          4.2          3.4    
University 22.5      24.1 23.8 21.6            24.5 24.4 39.5 41.3 39.2 36.1            39.5 40.4 16.7 18.4 18.7 16.3      19.3 18.9
Occupation, %                              
Managers 5.4      6.8 6.0 2.6            3.9 4.1 5.3 8.3 6.4 4.4            2.5 3.1 5.4 6.2 5.9 2.0      4.4 4.4
Professionals 17.9      18.5 17.3 14.8            19.1 18.4 41.9 43.1 37.9 28.3            41.5 41.8 9.7 10.3 10.4 9.9      11.3 10.2
Associate professionals 16.0  15.4  16.8  20.3            16.5 16.9 26.8 22.5 26.9 35.5            25.5 25.5 12.4 13.0 13.5 14.8      13.3 13.9
Clerks 6.0      5.9 6.7 5.8            6.8 6.3 4.4 4.2 4.9 7.9            5.6 4.0 6.5 6.5 7.4 5.1      7.3 7.1
Service workers 8.7  8.6  8.7  14.4            9.3 9.2 10.9 10.6 10.4 6.4            10.9 10.6 8.0 7.9 8.2 17.3      8.8 8.8
Skilled agricultural workers 0.7  0.5  0.4  4.1            0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1            0.2 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.5 5.6      0.6 0.5
Craft workers 14.7  13.7  13.9  16.5            13.5 14.1 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.0            1.7 2.0 19.3 17.9 17.8 21.9      17.6 18.3
Operators and assemblers 18.9  18.1  17.8  6.8            17.3 18.2 3.6 3.0 3.4 1.9            3.4 3.5 24.2 23.1 22.6 8.6      22.2 23.3
Elementary occupations 11.7  12.6  12.3  14.5            13.1 12.4 6.1 7.0 7.9 13.5            8.8 9.3 13.6 14.5 13.8 14.9      14.6 13.5
Rural, %  23.0  21.1  21.3  23.9            21.8 21.3 23.7 23.4 23.6 27.2            25.4 24.8 22.8 20.4 20.5 22.7      20.5 20.1
Age, %                              
under 30  25.3  26.4  27.4  20.1            26.9 26.1 28.5 28.1 26.5 15.9            26.5 24.4 24.1 25.9 27.7 21.7      27.1 26.7
30-40 23.5  24.5  23.0  25.5            23.2 24.9 23.3 23.8 25.8 25.0            25.4 27.0 23.5 24.7 22.1 25.7      22.4 24.2
40-50 30.1  29.0  28.9  30.5            28.4 27.3 28.2 28.4 27.8 32.0            27.5 25.0 30.8 29.3 29.2 29.9      28.8 28.1
50 + 21.2      20.1 20.7 23.9            21.5 21.8 20.0 19.8 19.9 27.2            20.6 23.7 21.5 20.2 21.0 22.7      21.8 21.1
Average tenure, years  7.7  8.0  7.5   7.6          7.6 8.1 8.8 8.4  8.7          9.3 7.5 7.7 7.3  7.3    7.0
Fraction of workers with less than 1 year of 
tenure. %  16.7      18.0 18.7 13.5            17.9 18.1 11.8 11.2 12.1 8.5            10.5 9.9 18.3 20.3 20.9 15.3      20.5 21.0
Average working week  43.2  43.5  43.3  41.0            43.3 43.5 39.2 39.6 39.6 38.6            39.4 40.0 44.5 44.8 44.6 41.9      44.6 44.8
Fraction of workers engaged in intensive 
manual work. %  27.3      29.0 28.3                    - - 10.9  13.5  13.0 - - 32.9  34.1  33.5 - -
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 
RLMS RLMS RLMS NOBUS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS  RLMS NOBUS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS RLMS NOBUS RLMS  RLMS 
Fraction of working time spent on intensive 
manual work (for those engaged in intensive 
manual work), % 
47.9      44.8 42.7 -        - - 31.9  33.5  31.7 -        - - 49.7  46.3  44.1 -      - -
Average wage, current rubles  1702  2559  3407  3438            4250 5247 1146 1671 2452 2949            2853 3600 1891 2856 3727 3621      4735 5818
Average wage, September 2000 rubles  1661  2073  2385   2620  2885  1119  1356  1722  1762  1985  1846  2313  2607  2918  3198 
Regular secondary employment, %  5.2  5.5  5.1  3.0            5.3 5.0 7.9 8.2 8.4 5.6            8.5 8.4 4.3 4.5 4.0 2.1      4.3 3.8
Supplementary occasional work, %  6.2  6.2  5.1  1.0            5.4 4.4 5.8 6.7 5.2 1.0            4.9 4.0 6.4 6.0 5.0 1.0      5.6 4.6
Pensioners, %  12.5  11.6  11.9  12.1            12.9 12.5 17.0 15.8 16.3 18.4            16.7 17.9 10.9 10.1 10.5 9.7      11.6 10.6
N  3758      4263 4518 46622 4472        4525 954  1068 1134 12530 1153          1165 2804 3195 3384 34092 3319    3360
Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 15-72 employed in the corporative sector. 
 
 Table 2а. Public-private wage gap (in percent of the private sector wages), RLMS 










 %  %  R2  %  R2  %  %  % 
All  -39%  -28% 0.44 -26% 0.46  -18%  -16%  -18%
Year                
2000 -39%  -28% 0.39 -28% 0.42  -20%  -19%   
2001 -41%  -32% 0.40 -30% 0.42  -24%  -22%   
2002 -34%  -22% 0.42 -19% 0.44  -11%  -8%   
2003 -40%  -28% 0.45 -26% 0.47  -19%  -17%   
Males  -29%  -27% 0.40 -27% 0.43  -15%  -14%  -19%
Females  -32%  -30% 0.43 -27% 0.45  -19%  -17%  -18%
Age                
under  30 -46%  -36% 0.47 -35% 0.49  -29%  -28%   
30-40 -39%  -25% 0.44 -23% 0.46  -18%  -16%   
40-50 -37%  -24% 0.45 -23% 0.47  -14%  -12%   
50  + -32%  -26% 0.43 -24% 0.45  -11%  -9%   
Settlement type                 
Moscow + SPb  -55%  -39%  0.38  -37%  0.40  -39%  -35%   
regional  capitals -32%  -34% 0.43 -33% 0.45  -28%  -26%   
towns -42%  -31% 0.52 -31% 0.54  -28%  -26%   
rural area + urban-type 
settlements  -34%  -10% 0.36 -10% 0.39  5%  6%   
Education                
Incomplete secondary and less  -57%  -27%  0.48  -24%  0.50  -19%  -16%   
Complete  secondary -52%  -33% 0.44 -31% 0.46  -26%  -24%   
College -46%  -23% 0.40 -21% 0.43  -14%  -13%   
University -45%  -29% 0.40 -28% 0.42  -18%  -16%   
Occupation                
Managers -46%  -30% 0.44 -26% 0.47  -16%  -16%   
Professionals -45%  -28% 0.42 -26% 0.45  -16%  -14%   
Associate  professionals -47%  -30% 0.48 -29% 0.50  -21%  -19%   
Clerks -31%  -24% 0.48 -22% 0.50  -20%  -16%   
Service  workers -22%  -33% 0.49 -30% 0.51  -16%  -17%   
Craft  workers -67%  -42% 0.37 -38% 0.41  -33%  -22%   
Operators and assemblers  -49%  -27%  0.36  -23%  0.40  -18%  -11%   
Elementary  occupations -62%  -37% 0.47 -35% 0.49  -29%  -25%   
Region                
Centre -45%  -40% 0.42 -38% 0.45  -34%  -33%   
North-West -56%  -35% 0.51 -34% 0.53  -32%  -28%   
South -43%  -16% 0.42 -17% 0.45  -5%  -5%   
Volga -30%  -25% 0.45 -22% 0.49  -19%  -17%   
Urals -31%  -20% 0.55 -20% 0.57  -12%  -8%   
Siberia -23%  -14% 0.50 -14% 0.53  -3%  -2%   
Far  East -24%  -21% 0.59 -20% 0.60  -4%  -2%*   
Note: The basic specifications include the following variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, gender, 
marital status, education, occupation, duration of working week (log), firm size, settlement type, year, region, The 
augmented specifications additionally include secondary employment, fears of unemployment, non-pecuniary 
benefits.  
* marks the estimates NON-significant at 5% level.
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Table 2b. Public-private wage gap (in percent of the private sector wages), NOBUS 
  Raw data  OLS   SR 
All -19%  -16%  -17% 
Males   -8%  -14%  -17% 
Females -11%  -18%  -17% 
Age      
under 30  -22%  -20%  -24% 
30-40 -20%  -16%  -18% 
40-50 -17%  -14%  -15% 
50 + -17% -16%  -14% 
Settlement type       
large cities (more than 500000 residents) -21%  -23%  -28% 
medium-size cities (100000-500000 residents) -18%  -19%  -23% 
small towns, urban-type settlements -21%  -21%  -21% 
rural 2% *  0%  -1% 
Education      
No primary, primary -11% *  -6% *  -7% 
Incomplete secondary -28%  -19%  -20% 
Complete secondary -30%  -18%  -21% 
Complete secondary + vocational -34%  -20%  -23% 
Incomplete secondary + vocational -30%  -18%  -22% 
College -29% -16%  -17% 
Some university -28%  -21%  -19% 
University -24% -15%  -14% 
Occupation      
Managers -7% *  8%  7% 
Professionals -30% -16%  -15% 
Associate professionals -33% -18%  -19% 
Clerks -19% -13%  -14% 
Service workers -25%  -17%  -20% 
Craft workers -25%  -25%  -27% 
Operators and assemblers -22%  -18%  -20% 
Elementary occupations -31%  -22%  -25% 
Note: Independent variables in equations are gender, age, age squared, education, occupation, experience, region, 
settlement type, duration of working week (log) and type of labour contract. 
* marks the estimates NON-significant at 5% level. 
 Table 3. Fringe benefits 
  Public sector  Private sector 
  2000            2001    2002 2003 2004 2000 2001    2002 2003 2004
Vacation payments   98.5  98.2  98.5                99.1 98.9 88.7 86.6 86.6 85.0 83.4
Sickness  payments                      98.3 98.0 98.7 99.1 98.4 88.4 84.9 83.7 81.7 79.6
Maternity leave allowances (females)  96.3                    97.2 98.1 96.5 94.8 81.1 79.6 80.0 76.1 71.6
Subsidized  health  care  41.0                    47.7 43.7 34.6 33.1 33.5 36.9 34.8 29.3 22.9
Subsidized  vacation  trips                      46.7 58.9 56.1 44.2 39.4 39.4 45.6 42.8 33.6 26.1
Subsidized  child  care  13.2                    18.2 15.7 10.0 9.7 11.5 13.4 12.1 7.1 6.1
Subsidized  meals  13.3                    15.5 13.1 11.0 10.1 14.8 18.6 16.8 15.3 14.1
Subsidized  transport                      14.4 18.1 18.3 15.9 12.6 13.5 17.0 14.9 13.9 13.0
Training  24.8                    30.8 32.5 30.5 30.6 18.2 25.7 25.4 22.2 20.1
Loans  9.4                    10.8 10.3 7.5 6.1 14.5 22.7 22.0 16.3 12.9
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Table 4. Subjective characteristics 
  Public sector  Private sector 
  2000            2001    2002 2003 2004 2000 2001    2002 2003 2004
Life  satisfaction                 
Satisfied 19.1                    24.6 34.6 33.8 38.2 19.4 24.0 34.4 34.4 40.1
Both yes and no 24.6  23.9  26.7  26.1  26.6  24.2  25.3  27.8  26.5  26.8 
Not  satisfied 56.2                    51.5 38.7 40.1 35.1 56.4 50.7 37.8 39.2 33.1
Are you sure that you will be able to find 
a new job?                  
Yes 32.1                    40.8 40.2 40.1 36.4 29.5 36.7 36.6 36.3 35.7
Both yes and no 14.4  13.7  14.5  14.7  14.2  16.0  14.7  15.3  15.6  18.3 
No 53.5                    45.5 45.2 45.2 49.4 54.4 48.7 48.1 48.1 46.1
Are you anxious about job loss?                     
Yes 53.7                    48.4 45.9 48.2 49.9 60.4 52.5 55.0 53.5 53.9
Both yes and no 11.7  10.1  12.4  11.8  10.2  10.6  10.8  10.2  12.4  11.6 
No 34.6                    41.6 41.8 40.0 39.9 29.0 36.7 34.8 34.1 34.5
Fraction of those who want to change job 63.8                    63.9 68.2 65.9 71.5 62.1 65.5 64.1 66.0 69.6
Job satisfaction in general                     
Satisfied                   58.0 46.8  49.2 49.6 43.8 44.8
Both yes and no     15.7  21.0  21.7      18.1  21.6  24.6 
Not satisfied     26.4  32.3  29.1      32.2  34.6  30.6 
Satisfaction with working conditions                     
Satisfied                  52.0 44.4  48.2 44.7 41.1 41.0
Both yes and no     17.4  19.9  20.6      18.8  18.5  22.0 
Not satisfied     30.5  35.7  31.2      36.5  40.4  36.9 
Satisfaction with wage                      
Satisfied                  14.5 10.9  11.8 22.3 20.9 22.0
Both yes and no     11.1  9.0  10.9      13.2  15.2  16.8 
Not satisfied     74.4  80.1  77.3      64.6  64.0  61.2 
Satisfaction with career prospects                     
Satisfied                  44.6 37.3  35.6 33.6 32.1 28.6
Both yes and no     15.8  17.5  21.4      16.0  17.6  22.3 
Not satisfied     39.6  45.3  43.0      50.4  50.4  49.1 
 Table 5. Switching regression (RLMS, basic specification) 
Wage equation 
Public sector  Private sector 
Selection equation 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Age  0.056 10.91 0.033  8.61 -0.017 -2.10 
Age^2  -0.001  -10.31  0.000 -9.73 0.000 2.16 
Gender (female)  0.388 12.92 0.326 19.74 -0.304 -9.18 
Marital status (single)  -0.028  -1.30 0.032 1.96 0.002 0.06 
Education (incomplete secondary and less) 
Complete  secondary  0.083 1.74 0.100 4.47 -0.103  -1.89 
College  0.293 6.08 0.156 6.23 0.025 0.43 
University  0.517 10.22 0.418 14.50 0.020  0.32 
Occupation (elementary occupations) 
Managers  0.683 10.39 0.582 15.19 0.573  7.92 
Professionals  0.653  9.19  0.387 10.16 1.180 19.88 
Associate  professionals  0.544  8.62  0.395 13.13 0.756 13.25 
Служащие  0.456 6.97 0.281 8.90 0.077 1.08 
Service  workers  0.374 6.25 0.181 5.72 0.633 9.83 
Skilled  agricultural  workers  1.179 7.50 0.064 0.63 -0.523  -1.85 
Craft workers  0.223  1.90  0.394  15.36  -0.755  -8.88 
Operators and assemblers  0.322  4.36  0.364  14.48  -0.375  -5.57 
Working week (ln)  0.445 10.50 0.388 13.61 -0.556  -11.27 
Settlement type (rural+urban-type 
settlement)        
Moscow and S.-Pb.  0.333  6.68  0.864  30.30  -0.513  -8.89 
Regional capital  0.099  3.44  0.545  26.06  -0.220  -5.53 
Other towns  0.187  6.33  0.613  27.29  -0.209  -5.06 
Firm size (10 persons and less) 
11-50  0.116 2.28 0.045 1.78 0.676  13.20 
51-100  0.226 3.90 0.077 2.40 0.958  16.78 
101-500  0.260 5.03 0.083 3.18 0.659  12.15 
501-1000  0.223 3.30 0.148 5.09 0.303 4.20 
>  1000  0.218 3.33 0.223 8.18 -0.161  -2.16 
Year (2000)         
2001  0.149 5.23 0.189 9.02 -0.008  -0.20 
2002  0.476 18.21 0.357 18.01 -0.011 -0.27 
2003  0.482 18.03 0.489 24.32 -0.035 -0.87 
Region (South)         
Centre  0.088 2.62 0.246 9.48 -0.177  -3.65 
North-West  0.375  9.54  0.480 16.08 0.011  0.19 
Volga  0.002 0.06 -0.053 -2.16 0.036 0.73 
Urals  0.341 7.29 0.289 8.63 -0.084  -1.34 
Siberia  0.151 4.52 0.017 0.62 -0.084  -1.58 
Far  East  0.382 8.61 0.274 7.81 -0.097  -1.38 
Children under 7 in the household          0.117  3.44 
Constant  2.606 16.68 3.775 28.43 1.082  4.61 
 N = 12834     Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = 5.15   Prob>chi2 = 0.0232 
 ρ1 = 0.11. ρ2 = -0.13 
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